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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No.

vs.

16934

DAVID M. BALLS and RICHARD S.
JOHNS II, co-partners, dba
UTAH EXCAVATING,
Defendants-Respondents.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Arnold disagrees with many of defendants'

statements.

In

defendant's statement of facts, it is asserted (p.4) that Arnold
was willing to have the rental continue beyond six months so long
as payments were kept current.

That is true, but it is not sig-

nificant, because all that was discussed insofar as having the
lease

extend beyond

six months was

extension for one or two

months (T.266), not three years.
Defendants point out
statement.
event

the

(p. 4)

that Arnold filed a financing

Arnold did so in order to protect its priority in the
option was

exercised,

since

a UCC-1 must be filed

within ten days of delivery:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase
money security interest before or within ten days
after the debtor receives possession of the collateral, he takes priority over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor which arise between the time the security interest attaches and the
time of filing. 70A-9-301(2).

Because of the risk of loss of priority for failure to file,
even though a security interest was not intended,

the code was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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amended to provide that filing is not a factor in determining
whether or not a lease is intended as security.
A consignor or lessor of goods may file a financing
statement using the terms "consignor," "consignee,"
"lessor," "lessee" or the like instead of the terms
specified in section 70A-9-402.
The provisions of
this part shall apply as appropriate to such a financing statement but its filing shall not of itself
be a factor in determining whether or not the consignment or lease is intended as security [section
70A-l-201(37)].
However, if it is determined for
other reasons that the consignment or lease is so
intended, a security interest of the consignor or
lessor which attaches to the consigned or leased goods
is perfected by such filing. 70A-9-408.

Thus, the filing of a financing statement is no indication as to
whether there is a lease or a security interest.
Defendants

assert

(p. 5)

that

attempts

were made

to get

financing to enable them to exercise the option; but, before that
could be done, Arnold entered into a lease with Salt Lake County.
The evidence is to the contrary:

Q.

. .. When did you wish to exercise the option, at
the end of the six months?

A.

We had intended to do that. However at the end
of the six months we had not made six payments.
We didn't feel like we could obtain the financing at that time with the little amount that
we had accrued, so we didn't even attempt to
finance the machine at the end of six months.
(Johns T.212)

Q.

All right.
State what was said
termination, Arnold terminating?

A.

. .. He finally told me that he did not have the
money.
In his words, 'I guess I will have to
forget it.'
(Welch of Arnold T.318)

concerning

Arnold acted reasonably in attempting to dispose of the property,
by lease or sale,

when the defendants indicated they couldn't

finance it and would have to "forget it."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

Defendants

point

out

(p. 5)

that Arnold did not give them

notice that it was entering into the lease with Salt Lake County
or that it intended to dispose of the equipment, seemingly implying that defendants were not aware that Arnold would re-lease
or sell the equipment.
A.

The evidence is:

The last conversation that I finally had with Mr.
Balls, I told him it was subject to future rental
and that we did have people looking to rent this
machine. (Welch of Arnold T.318)

Defendants assert
parties

that

(p.5)

that it was stipulated between the

if defendants exercised their option to purchase,

then the various amounts would have to be paid depending on the
date

selected.

computation,

but

The

stipulation was

that

as

to

the

stipulation had nothing

correctness of
to

do with any

recognition that the option could be extended to any later dates
after the six-month lease had terminated.
Defendants assert

(p.7)

that their financial situation was

not typical of the seventy-five to eighty percent of those entering into equipment leases with Arnold, who do not exercise their
option to purchase.

Defendants' financial situation was typical.

Their

raise

inability

to

a

down payment was

one of the very

reasons that a lease instead of a contract of sale was chosen by
them.
A.

. .. And because of our financial condition,
not having sufficient money to make a down
payment and being aware that these kinds of
alternatives were available, we elected to
use that kind of an arrangement rather than
have to come up with that much capital at
that time in order to get the equipment to
put i t to use.
(Johns of Utah Excavating
T.195)
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Defendants assert

(p. 7)

that most of those who do not ex-

ercise the option have only a temporary need for the equipment
and that there was no testimony from Mr. Balls or Mr. Johns that
the

reason

for

the

lease was

to

whether their work would last.

give

them

time

to

determine

To the contrary, the other reason

that a lease instead of a contract of sale was chosen by defendants was that they only had work "more or less" committed.

Q.

What was that?

A.

That we were interested in obtaining a backhoe so
that we could use it to perform work that we had
more or less had committed to us if we had that
type of equipment.
(Johns of Utah Execavating
T.169)

A.

. .. nor were they sure if the type of work they
had was going to last for this two or three-year
period. So in lieu of buying the piece of equipment we then elected to rent it to them until
they found out if the work was going to hold out.
(Byerline of Arnold T. 110, 111)

Defendants
financing

reiterate

right up until

(p. 7)

that

they attempted to arrange

the time the equipment was leased to

The evidence is to the contrary (supra p. 2).

Salt Lake County.

Defendants assert (p.8) that Mr.

Johns did contemplate what

the machine would be worth after six months, but had not made any
calculations as to an exact figure.
erly represented.

He testified that he had no such anticipation:

Q.

Did you form an expectation as to what the equipment, or an anticipation as to what the equipment, would be worth after one year?

A.

No.

Defendants
lease,

His testimony is not prop-

I

don't recall having done that.

assert

(p. 8)

that

they

did

(T .190)

not

terminate the

but attempted to arrange financing even after the equip-

ment was

returned.

As pointed out above, Mr. Johns testified,
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"We didn't even attempt to finance the machine at the end of six
months. 11

(T. 212)

and

that

they

would

have

to

11

forget

it."

(T.318)
Defendants assert (p.8) that the court did not state that it
was a waste of its time to consider the intention of the parties
as to when the option would be exercised. The court stated:

MR. DIBBLEE:
Well, I mean I didn't, I thought that that issue was
more or less concluded and there wasn't any sense of
wasting the Court's time.

THE COURT:
I think it really is myself ...

DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT POINT I.
Defendants assert (p.8) that they had the option to acquire
the equipment for no additional consideration and that,
fore,

the

lease was

in tended as

security.

there-

Their argument is

based upon the construction of the provision in the written lease
relating to the term of the lease.

It is submitted that defen-

dants and the lower court erroneously concluded that Arnold could
not terminate the lease at any time unless the defendants were in
default and that the lease could thus run forever. By extending
the term to whatever long enough period at which rentals would
necessarily exceed the option price, obviously a point is reached
at which no additional consideration would have to be paid.

As

pointed out in appellant's brief, such is not a reasonable construction of the lease.

The provisions

for default relate to

reasons for termination while the lease is in effect rather than
being a limitation on the right to terminate.
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The construction of this written lease as made by the lower
court is not binding upon this Supreme Court and, in fact, the
lower court 1 s "views thereon are not indulged any special credit•

This court said in Ephraim Theater Company v. Hawk 7 U 2d

II

163, 321 P2d 221, 223:
Unless uncertainty opens the door to extraneous explanation, the trial court is in no position of advantage
in interpreting documents, and his views thereon are
not indulged any special credit as are findings on
issues of fact.

As stated in SA CJS Appeal and Error, § 1660:
Since the interpretation of a written instrument presents a question of law, however, a reviewing court is
not bound by the conclusion of the trial court. Thus,
the appellate court is not bound by the trial court's
construction of unambiguous language of a written
document, or by the construction of a written instrument based solely on the terms of the instrument,
where no extrinsic evidence was introduced on the
issue of its proper construction, or where the evidence is without conflict and not susceptible of
conflicting inferences, and i f a finding is in conflict with an express provision of a written agreement
of the parties, which is the controlling fact in the
case, the finding will be disregarded by the appellate
court.

There was testimony as to extension of the lease term for a
few months, but there was no evidence relating to whether or not
the lease was perpetual insofar as the lessor was concerned other
than the lease document itself.

Consequently,

it is the pre-

rogative of this court to properly construe the written instrument.
With a proper construction of the termination provision in
the lease, the authorities cited by defendants in their Point I.
are inapplicable.
Brief,

even

if

Furthermore, as pointed out in our Appellant's
applicable

their

rationale

is

fallacious and

should not be followed.
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DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT POINT II.
Defendants argue that under the
FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers,

three tests set forth in
U 2d

, 590 P2d 803 the

lease was intended as security.
Test 1.

(Compare the option price with the original list

price or the price of the property.)

Obviously, when any lease

term is infinitely extended, total lease payments will exceed the
price of the property, and thus no additional consideration would
have to be paid upon exercise of the option to acquire title.
But when viewed
transaction,

as of the

at which

time the parties entered into the

time they intended that the option,

if

exercised, would be exercised at the end of the six-month lease,
payment of the substantial option price of $75,736.50 would have
been necessary as compared with the $92,220 original value.

That

is not a nominal consideration.
Test 2
natives.

11

)

(Compare

the

option price with

"sensible

alter-

Defendants argue that Arnold's salesman represented

that Utah Excavating was building up an equity with each payment.
It could have become an "equity" if defendants had work to do to
utilize the machine at the end of the six months, and if defendants could get financing at the end of six months, and if they
then elected to convert the lease to a contract of purchase.

At

the time the lease was entered into, defendants were not sure
that they had work, nor that they could finance it in the future.
With either foresight or hindsight, as to need for the machine
and as to ability to finance, there was a sensible alternative to
the payment of an additional $75, 736. 50 in order to acquire a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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machine, which was, to begin with, worth $92,220 and which would
have had an addi tiona1 six months'
sible alternative was

to not

"wear and tear."

agree

to buy

it

if

That sen-

it was

then

neither needed nor affordable.
Test 3
at

the

time

(Compare the option price with the fair market value
the option is to be exercised.)

Defendants again

rely upon values and option prices at various dates beyond the
intended lease period assuming that the option could be exercised
at any time in perpetuity.

Even if those values were relevant,

defendants'

estimates of value at the various times selected by

them (p.17)

are high,

as shown by comparing their estimate for

March 1979 of $81,000 with the $66,400 paid by Salt Lake County
in March 1979 in an arms-length sale with competitive bidding.
DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT POINT III.
Defendants argue that the trial court's "finding" that the
agreement
tained.

is

intended as

a

security instrument should be sus-

This is more a conclusion of law than it is a finding of

fact, and it is based upon the trial court's construction of the
equipment rental agreement that it could be terminated by Arnold
only for cause and that, so far as defendants were concerned, it
would continue in perpetuity and that the option could be exercised at an infinite time in the future.
As pointed out previously (supra ps. 5, 6), the construction
of a written agreement by the lower court is not binding upon
this

court because interpretation of a written instrument pre-

sents a question of law.

Ephraim Theater v. Hawk 7 U2d 163, 321

P2d 221; SA CJS Appeal & Error §1660.

A reasonable construction
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of the lease is that either party could terminate without cause
after six months.

If such a reasonable construction is given by

this court, then the argument of defendants that the option could
be exercised with the payment of no consideration at an infinite
time

in

the future is inapplicable.

The inescapable alternate

conclusion is that a substantial consideration would have to have
been paid at the time when the parties intended the option was to
be exercised.
Defendants argue
rental

agreement

equity

in

correct

the

was

(p. 21)
to

that "the purpose of the equipment

enable Utah Excavating

excavator."

That

statement would be

that

statement

is

to

acquire

an

misleading.

A

"the purpose of the equipment

rental agreement was to enable Utah Excavating to determine at a
later date whether or not its jobs were such that it would need
to purchase the excavator.
were
then,

made

during

a

In the meantime if rental payments

sixth month period,

Utah Excavating could

if it desired, exercise its option to purchase the equip-

ment and

then

enter into

a

contract

to purchase

it,

applying

rental payments as a down payment."
DEFENDANTS' POINT IV.
Defendants assert that Arnold would not be entitled to recover the unpaid

rental

payments

because Arnold had not given

written notice of the sale to Salt Lake County as required by the
UCC for conditional sale repossessions.

Defendants cite FMA as

authority therefor.
There

are

three

possibilities

with

authorities

for

each

position as to the effect of failing to comply with the requireSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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men ts

of

the

code:

(1)

award damages

deficiency award to lessor,
ciency.

or ( 3)

to

lessee,

( 2) bar any

presume lessor has no defi·

A Utah Law Review article summarizes these alternatives

as follows:
Section 9-507 (1) permits the debtor to recover from
the secured party any loss caused by the secured
party's failure to comply with the provisions of part
5. Although the Code speaks no further on this issue,
three distinct positions have emerged regarding the
effect of a failure to notify the debtor upon the
secured party's right to recover a deficiency. The
first is the "sole remedy" rule which limits the
debtor to the remedy that a strict reading of Section
9-507 provides: 'the debtor can either bring a separate action or assert a setoff or counterclaim in the
deficiency suit to recover for the damages caused by
the failure to notify.' Second is the 'no deficiency
rule, ' which makes notice by the secured party a
condition precedent to recovery of deficiency judgment.
Third is the 'Arkansas Rule, 1 under which a
failure to notify does not result in a bar to a deficiency judgment, but rather triggers a presumption
that the collateral was worth at least the amount of
the debt. The burden is then placed on the secured
party to prove what would have been realized from a
commercially reasonable sale.
Utah Law Review, 1979 No. 3, 567, 573 Leases As Security Agreements And The Effect of A Failure To Notify
On A Secured Party's Recovery Of A Deficiency
Judgment: FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers

It is not clear from the FMA decision which of the three rules
should apply if the lease here were, as a matter of law, a conditional sale.

This court said that FMA Financial Corp. "did not

meet the burden of proving all aspects of the sale where commercially

reasonable."

FMA Financial

(supra

at

807-808).

This

language indicates that the court was applying what was referred
to above as the "Arkansas Rule," which does not bar recovery if
it is shown that the sale was commercially reasonable and that
the proceeds therefrom were insufficient to discharge the debt.
Here the sale was to the county, a disinterested third party, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

Arnold had every reason to sell at the highest price obtainable.
There is nothing to show that, had notice been given any better
or higher price,
equipment.
rule"

would have been obtained on the sale of the

If this court had been adopting the "no deficiency

in FMA, it could have ended its analysis upon finding a

failure to notify and would not have needed to discuss the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable sale.
this

court did discuss

the failure

The fact that

to conduct a commercially

reasonable sale suggests that it was leaning tward the "Arkansas
Rule,"

under which

commercial

reasonableness

once the failure to notify is established.
be applicable,

becomes

relevant

Assuming that rule to

Arnold did show that it sold in a commercially

reasonable manner to the county and realized $66 ,400 from such
sale.

If~

as

a matter of law,

there was a conditional sale

instead of a lease, then the "amount of the debt" would be the
option price of $92,220 plus the option charges of $17,291 (1\%
per month for the fifteen months from the date of the contract to
date of sale to the county) or a total of $109,511.

Subtracting

payments received:
Defendant's rental payments
Salt Lake County rental payment

$ 17,095
22,000

Salt Lake County purchase pay't
Total Payments

66,400
$105,495

the difference would be $4,016.

(Ex. D9)
(T.97,142,
Ex. DlO)
( Ex . 6 , T . 12 7 )

Thus, even if the lower court's

conclusion that a security interest was created were correct,
Arnold would still be entitled to a $4,016 deficiency.
Defendants argue (p.23) that "the law abhors a forfeiture"
but theh misapplies the rule.

The effect of the lower court's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

decision is to forfeit the lessor's right to rentals just because
of a technical failure to give a notice of sale which it did not
know it had to give because,

understandably,

dealing with a lease and not a sale.
have changed matters,

it· thought it was

·

Writ ten notice would not ~

inasmuch as defendants were already aware

that Arnold intended to dispose of the machine and defendants had
stated they would have "to forget it because they did not have
(T.318)

financing."

The notice,

therefore, would have accom-

plished nothing.
Defendants cite dollar figures (p.23) showing total amounts
received
their

from

Arnold

analysis

rental payments

to

from

all

recognize

sources.

the

fact

Defendants

failed in

that monthly

short-term

are usually higher than monthly long-term con-

tract payments because of the difference in overhead and depreci·
ation.

More importantly, defendants' analysis omits the

1~%

per

month option charge which according to the terms of the option
must be added to the price of the equipment to cover that over·
head,

the principal item of which is interest on the funds tied

up in the equipment.
CONCLUSION

tuity

The

lower

1.

It misconstrued the lease agreement as being in perpe-

so

court

long as

was

in error

for

the

following

reasons:

rental payments were received insofar as the

lessor was concerned, but being only for a six-month period and
so long thereafter as lessee may desire it to continue insofar as
the lessee was concerned.

Construction of the written lease is a

matter of law and this court should correct that misconstruction.
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding as
for digitization
provided
Institute of Museum and
Library Services +-~ both
When
properly
construed
being
a by the
six-monrh
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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,... ...

i

\

parties,

but to continue thereafter so long as both parties are

in agreement that it should continue,
fails.

the lower court's analysis

The point at which it is determined as to whether or not

a substantial payment would remain to acquire title would then be
at the end of six months,

not at

the ultimate time,

which any

lease in perpetuity would reach when the rental payments would
exceed the initial value of the property.
2.

Written notice of the sale to the county was not given

because the parties thought there was a lease and not a sale, and
that

therefore no notice was needed.

Defendants were actually

aware that Arnold was going to dispose of the equipment.

They

also had indicated they were giving up any claim to same.
3.

A sale would have been intended only if both parties

were bound, Arnold to sell
all

or

bound

substantially
to

pay more

essential

element

all

than
of

a

for
of

the price and defendants to pay

same.

small

Here,

defendants

were

percentage of the price.

a

sale,

that

both parties

there

were,

as

matter

not
The

be bound,

is

lacking.
4.

Even

interest,
was

not

claim.

if

a

of

law,

a

security

the court assumed that because written notice of sale
given,

as

Defendants

provided by
thereby

the

obtained

Code,
free

Arnold
use

of

forfeited

its

the machine.

Such should not be the case where the sale is shown to be reasonable

and where

it

is

shown

that

nothing

different would have

occurred if notice had been given, which was shown here.

There

should be no forfeiture.
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5.

The FMA decision is not controlling here because in

-FMA

the les-see was bound to pay rentals during the full lease period
of

thirty-six months,

and

there then was

truly only a nominal

consideration left to be paid in order to capture the equipment.
Here,

the lessees were only bound to pay six months'

rental at

the end of which time they had the option to pay the substantial
sum to purchase the equipment or to return the equipment without
any obligation.
The option price at the end of six months, or at the time
the property was sold to the county, was a very substantial sum
which in no way could be deemed ''nominal consideration."
Respectfully submitted,

John W. Lowe, Lowe & Associates
for Plaintiff

~ttorney
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